Company mergers, and the regulations surrounding them, occupy a central policy debate among lawmakers, scholars, and the general public in many countries. A core question emerges from this pressing topic: How to best interpret the data about merger prohibition rates and merger deterrence?
In a May 20, 2026 editorial article in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (JECLAP), Dynamic Competition Initiative (DCI) authors Selcukhan Unekbas, Bowman Heiden, Frederic Jenny, Nicolas Petit, and David Bosco argue “it is crucial to consider the rate of excessive deterrence in any discussion on whether merger enforcement is too lax or too strict.”
The article points out that deterrence occurs in two primary forms. First, frequency effects: “Stricter merger enforcement reduces the overall volume of deal activity.” Second, composition effects: “Firms do not simply abandon deals; they restructure them.”
Three categories of implications come about: policy, legal, and methodology, and the authors warn, “The deals that were never proposed, the mergers that were restructured beyond recognition, the acquisitions that became acquihires do not show up in the prohibition rate. But they may represent the most consequential impact of merger policy.”